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Fides Quaerens Rectitudinis Intellectum: Christian Faith and Practical Rationality in Anselm¹

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It has been remarked that in modernity, discussions about faith and reason, especially when carried out by philosophers, are very often framed in principally epistemological terms, and focus narrowly on epistemological concerns (even when, as in early modernity, the underlying concerns were moral, but epistemology was how they were dealt with). This is not to say that this is only the case in modernity, nor that this is always the case in modernity. Nor do I mean to suggest that there is anything wrong with epistemology, its terms, its concerns, or its practitioners. Knowledge, not to mention wisdom, is, after all a very great good, one which we naturally desire and pursue, and truth is also a very great good. Anselm clearly thinks that these are goods, and thinks we should strive to attain them. He also recognizes the value of something essential though not exclusive to the activity of epistemology, the reflective posture in which the human mind reflects upon itself and its activities. Self-knowledge is a good, even a duty, in Anselm's view, and this must necessarily include orientation by some epistemological concerns: what truth is; what intellectual perfections such as knowledge or wisdom are; what our modes of access to reality are; the capacities and limitations of our intellect or reason; modes of error and our remedies for addressing them. In any Christian philosophy or theology deserving of the name, Christian faith must play some central role in all of this, and the grand and recurring problem of the relations between faith and reason arises.

There is great risk, particularly in the intellectual culture of modernity, of carrying out reductions and truncations of this problem and of its components by following the temptation to focus exclusively on epistemological concerns. Faith and reason come to be framed either as alternate and somehow complementary modes or generators of knowledge, or one form or another of the varieties of rationalism or fideism is adopted. The sole questions on which investigation of the relationship between faith and reason turns are those like: Which one of these should we trust to provide us certainty, truth, or knowledge? What should we do when conflicts inevitably arise between religious teachings and reasoning's dictates or results? Can reason legitimately start from, interpret, understand, or further elaborate religious faith? In these, faith is construed as primarily doxastic, by which I mean that the prime focus is placed on its capacity to

¹ This paper was originally read at the 2009 4th International Saint Anselm conference at St. Anselm College. It is currently being revised for publication elsewhere, and is supplied here in the FSU Digital Commons as a working paper.

supply or substitute for knowledge, to provide certainty or conviction. Reason is understood as simply theoretical or speculative reason or rationality. Both faith and reason as realities are much broader in scope, however, and there is great risk of imposing impoverishing conceptions upon them which then inevitably result in inadequate understanding of faith, reason, and of their possible, actual, or desirable relations.

In interests of space and time, rather than further elaborating and arguing these well-worn points, I will instead make another set, and then lead directly into our itinerary. We do not, and faith and reason do not just fit within and address, solely epistemological concerns, let alone the even more narrowed concerns and assumptions of epistemologically-driven-enquiry. We possess, or are possessed by, additional and perhaps more encompassing concerns. Some of these are describable as metaphysical, anthropological, or aesthetic, but those I concentrate on here are better described as moral.² Faith and reason take up, respond to, and are articulated in relation to matters of moral values and norms, human nature and development, community and relationships, and our final end or ends. Practical reason, or value-and-action-oriented rationality, engages, articulates, and guides us in commerce with, these concerns. The type of enquiry driven by these concerns is broader in scope, more fundamental, and more vital than epistemologically-driven enquiry, and necessarily involves, indeed partially embodies and enacts, practical reason. The rich relationship between faith and reason needs to be worked out in both theory and practice through this type of enquiry, which is what Anselm himself does, albeit never systematically. In this paper's four main parts, my aim is bring out and lend some rigor to faith's and reason's dialectical relationship in Anselm's thought, works and life.

I. Senses of Faith and Reason

What does Anselm mean by reason or by faith? Before discussing the relation between faith and reason in Anselm's thought, examination of what he means by these words is needed. In an Anselmian perspective, grasping the full meaning of words or concepts carries us beyond mere lexicality into the reality of the thing signified or conceived, so this examination will also lead into brief investigation of what those things are. Let us start with faith, *fides*, which possesses a number of interlocking senses. Anselm uses it to mean Christian belief, both as the state of believing, and as what is believed, i.e. the content, the Christian revelation, "what the Catholic Church believes in its heart and confesses with its mouth."³ This can be expressed in and

² Because they refer to God, to a created order, to a normativity oriented by and towards God, and to a human nature affected by the Fall and redeemed by the Incarnation and Atonement, these concerns might also be called "religious," but I avoid using that term here. It implies that there is a religious sphere or dimension discrete and separable from these other spheres, a cultural assumption of modernity which Anselm would certainly consider untrue.

³ *De Incarnatione Verbi* 1, p. 6. All translations from Anselm's treatises are the author's (I have consulted those of Hopkins and Richardson, McKeon, Deane, Williams, and Charlesworth) and are from *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi opera omnia*, ed. Dom F. S. Schmitt, O.S.B. 5 vols (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and

does involve propositional content, but is not identical to it. “Faith,” Anselm says, “is from that, which the mind conceives through hearing; it is not that the mind’s conception alone that creates faith in the human being, but rather that faith cannot be without a conception.”⁴

Faith is also a theological virtue,⁵ and thinking in such terms leads us beyond viewing faith as simply propositions believed in, belief in those propositions, or the habit of such belief. For Anselm, faith more complexly and progressively enmeshes a human being with reality (both created and divinely creative) through three main aspects. First, faith involves “striving” (*tendere*), which in *Monologion* is explicitly framed as striving towards God, but which could also be towards created things in God, or towards truth, or any other of the divine attributes in God.⁶ Living faith necessarily takes on flesh in actions and volitions oriented by⁷ justice or rectitude.

Sons. 1940-1961), or from *Liber Anselmi de Humanis Moribus*, in *Memorials of St. Anselm*, R.W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt, O.S.B., eds. (London: Oxford University Press. 1969). All citations of Anselm’s texts provide the chapter number (prefaced where appropriate by the book number), and the page number of the appropriate volume of the *Opera Omnia* or *Memorials*. Each text will be cited with these abbreviations.

M	<i>Monologion</i>
P	<i>Proslogion</i>
DV	<i>De Veritate</i>
DL	<i>De Libertate Arbitrii</i>
DCD	<i>De Casu Diaboli</i>
CDH	<i>Cur Deus Homo</i>
DC	<i>De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato</i>
DC	<i>De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio</i>
DI	<i>De Incarnatione Verbi</i>
DM	<i>Liber Anselmi Archiepiscopi de Humanis Moribus per Similitudines</i>
DA	<i>Liber ex Dictis Beati Anselmi</i>

For reasons exceeding the scope of this paper, I follow Schmitt and Southern in considering the last two works to be reliably Anselmian.

Passages from Anselm’s letters are from *The Letters of Saint Anselm of Canterbury*, 3 vols. trans. Walter Froelich (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications. 1990-94), and are cited with the abbreviation E, followed by the letter number and page number from the appropriate volume.

⁴ DC 3.6, p. 271

⁵ In DI 1, Anselm writes of the “firmness of faith” (*soliditatem fidei*), p. 7. A tenet enunciated constantly in his writings is that the Christian faith is or should be held so strongly that, even if it is not understood, seems contrary to reason, or seems to contain contradictions in itself, one will nevertheless cleave to it. Cf. M 76, P1, DI 1, CDH 1.1, also Ep. 136. In DC 3.9, he argues that faith (as well as hope), which is “of those things which are not seen,” are needed in order for humans to fully merit heavenly beatitude, “by the merit of faith and hope we might more gloriously attain to the happiness we desire,” p. 276. Anselm does not discuss virtues systematically in his works, but very clearly thinks in terms of virtues and vices, mentioning them too many times in his letters to cite individual instances. In DC, he touches on a controversial position about the basis for “the entire efficacy of the virtues,” 3.1, p.264. Cf. also DHM 2-3 90, 96, 119, 133-135, where Anselm discusses virtues in a somewhat more systematic (though regrettably not comprehensive) fashion.

⁶ Clearly the human being living out an Anselmian ethic would strive in this manner after justice, truth, goodness, beauty, unity, simplicity, wisdom, reason, and blessedness. Indeed we see Anselm and his interlocutors engaged in precisely such efforts in his treatises, in Eadmer’s *Vita*, and in the Letters.

⁷ By “oriented by”, I mean that the person subjects their volitions, actions, and thoughts to the norms of rectitude, and that they thereby seek rectitude. Seeking can mean seeking to understand more fully, to uncover the genuine norms, to discern their deeper structures, to judge rightly how to understand rectitude in a condition of

“[T]hat faith which love accompanies and comes together with, when the opportunity of acting is given it, will not be idle but will exert itself with great frequency to actions [*operum*],” Anselm writes, leading into the second aspect by adding, “which it will not be able to do without love.”⁸ Faith incorporates love, and this involves a relationship not just between believer and believed content, but between persons. It involves trust and belief, but also questioning and seeking, progressive deepening and unfolding of the relationship. For Anselm, faith will thus be closely bound to hope and even friendship, as well as love. The third aspect is that faith is transformative of the faithful person in ways relevant even to rationality. Although faith is by its very essence, “of those things that are not seen,”⁹ it also provides some experiential knowledge (*experientus scientia*) of those things, for Anselm a precondition of adequate knowledge or understanding of those things.¹⁰ Faith practiced over time on the one hand “cleanses the heart,”¹¹ and on the other provides the “spiritual wings” or the “ladder,”¹² needed for raising the fallible and at times feeble human rational mind to the divine.

Anselm uses “reason” or its cognates in a number of ways. Here, I pass over uses of *ratio*, where it simply means something like “the reason for” or “the reason that.” We are concerned with four uses here. First, Anselm uses *ratio* to designate a power or faculty of the human soul. He uses it, second, for what it is that reason produces or grasps, intelligible accounts of realities. Third, he employs the cognate of *ratio*, *rationalis*, of the human (and angelic) being or nature, mind, will, and actions. Finally, *ratio* is also a divine attribute. Let us note just in passing that for Anselm the divine reason is both reason itself (i.e. the supreme reason) and is what God is substantially. Of the third, let us note that rationality is an essential dimension pervading the whole of the human being.¹³ Our intellectual and free volitional life, capacities, and activities flow from this inextricable dimension,¹⁴ and reason in his third, and broader sense extends so far as do these.

moral conflict. It can also mean seeking, as in seeking out those who one can say have rectitude, or situations, relationships, institutions which have and convey rectitude. It can further mean the desire for and love of rectitude. It reaches a culmination in seeking the very source of rectitude.

⁸ M 78, p. 84. Cf. also DC 3.2: “nor is he said to have any but a dead faith, who does not will to act rightly according to the faith, on account of which [right willing and acting] faith is given,” p. 265.

⁹ DC 3.9, p. 276.

¹⁰ DI 1, p. 9

¹¹ DI 1, p. 8

¹² DI 1, p. 7

¹³ In fact, it gives rational creatures a dignity unparalleled by the rest of created being. Not only does rationality add a higher level of being (cf. M 31), it gives the rational nature a certain sublimity, and Anselm declares “it is recognized that God created nothing more precious than rational nature,” CDH 2.4, p. 99.

¹⁴ Only a rational nature can have a genuinely free will (able to determine itself, rather than simply determined by its appetites or the being’s nature), and only a rational nature can thus keep, and ought to keep justice. Cf. DV 5,12, DLA 3-4, 12, DCD 12, 16, CDH 1.9, 1.15, 2.1, DCV 3, DC 1.3, 1.6. Anselm considers infants not to actually have a rational will until they come to possess rationality, DCV 7, DC 3.2.

In the first, more restricted sense reason, as a power (*vis*) of the soul, is something distinct from will, and from at least some other faculties or powers, such as bodily sense and (corporeal) imagination, inner sense, and probably memory (at least insofar as memory is of corporal images, or of non-corporeal pleasures, pains, and desires). Anselm does not rigorously distinguish reason, as a faculty or as an activity, from thought, and in *Monologion* for instance, the reason of the human maker contains “something of the thing to be made, a pattern so to speak, or better said a form or likeness or rule.”¹⁵ He also does not distinguish reason from “understanding,” whether in the sense of the activity, *intelligere*, or in the sense of a faculty, *intellectus*.¹⁶ Anselm does tell us some key things about the power of reason in relation to will. First, the rational being always possesses both reason and will, the latter free because the will of a rational being.¹⁷ Second, neither reason nor will are the whole of the soul, but rather something(s) in it,¹⁸ beings but not substances.¹⁹ Third, the soul uses them like instruments to carry out its proper acts (*velut instrumentis ad usus congruos*), reason’s proper activity being “reasoning” (*ratiocinandum*).²⁰ Fourth, both reason and will are not simply instruments, since both “individual instruments

¹⁵ M 9, p. 24

¹⁶ Some Anselm interpreters have attempted to import into or impose upon Anselm’s writings a strong distinction between *ratio* and *intellectus*, e.g. Edward J. O’Toole: “*Intellectus* and *ratio* are distinguished by Anselm and for that matter by all Christian philosophers. *Intellectus* stands for spirit; it is the structural dynamism between each man and his God,” (he does not tell the reader what by contrast *ratio* is), “Anselm’s Logic of Faith,” *Analecta Anselmiana*, v. 3, p.149.

Victor W. Roberts, O.S.B., marshaling Schmitt, makes a more subtle distinction: “The term *ratio* is Anselm can have several meanings. It can mean the higher, or intellectual part in man. . . and more particularly the faculty whereby the mind can reason about reality. Corresponding to this faculty and also designated by *ratio* is the objective ground on which this activity is exercised. . . [Schmitt] distinguishes between *ratio* and *intellectus* and applies this distinction to faith: ‘*Ratio* and *intellectus* are distinguished in the following way: *ratio* is the objective ground of a thing; *intellectus* is the insight into this ground. Thus *ratio fidei* is the objective ground, accessible to reason, the why of a truth of reason; *intellectus fidei* is the insight into this ground, its evidence.’ Thus it is through the exercise of a faculty of *ratio* that the mind comes to grasp the ground (*ratio*) of a reality, and in this grasp the insight (*intellectus*) into the reality, which is the goal of cognition, takes place.” Notice however, that even if Schmitt’s interpretation is unquestionably accepted, *ratio* and *intellectus* are clearly not distinguished as faculties, but rather are contrasted as follows: *ratio* is the faculty by which *intellectus* (a mode of operation of *ratio*) grasps the *ratio* (as what reason can grasp) of truths of the faith.

In point of fact, while granting some plausibility to Schmitt’s interpretation, in my view Anselm seems to use *ratio* and *intellectus* as activities and in the sense of “rational account” fairly interchangeably. Not only does he roughly equate spiritus, mens, and ratio in DC 3.13, p.285, he is recorded in a provocative passage from the *Dicta Anselmi*, as having taught: “there are many names of the soul, certain of which, though they appear to possess certain specific properties [*proprietas*], still are found to have been set in place of the soul itself in different places. For it is called spirit, mind [*mens*], mind [*animus*], reason, intellect, the interior man” DA 17, p. 175. De Lubac evinces a similar skepticism on textual grounds about distinguishing *ratio* from *intellectus*, *Recherches dans la foi: Trois études sur Origène, saint Anselme, et la philosophie chrétienne* (Paris: Beauchesne), p. 100-3. Cf. also Pierre Michaud-Quentin, “notes sur le vocabulaire psychologique de saint Anselme,” *Spicilegium Becenesse*, v. 1.

¹⁷ Cf. DV 5, DL 5.

¹⁸ DC 3.11, p. 279

¹⁹ DCD 8, p. 245

²⁰ DC 3.11, p. 279

possess their being as such [*hoc quod sunt*], their aptitudes, and their uses or acts [*usus*].”²¹ Reason and will in the latter two senses can be defective or fail, and require guidance, training, and right intention to function well in their proper activities.

Reason in its second sense actually signifies two distinct kinds of things that, however, can and should converge. On the one hand, it signifies the products of the activity of human reasoning, whether in the more true medium whereby “the things themselves” are expressed “inwardly in our minds, by imagination of bodies or reason’s understanding [*rationis intellectu*] corresponding to [*pro*] the diversity of the things themselves,”²² or the less faithful ones of mental signs, speech, or writing.²³ Often, *ratio* in this sense gets translated as “argument,”²⁴ as “reasoning,” or “account.”²⁵ On the other hand, Anselm also writes of the “reason of faith,” or of “deeper reasons” for some matter of the faith rationally explored and investigated in his works. The first expression appears in *Proslogion*²⁶ as a description of *Monologion*, and in *Cur Deus Homo*²⁷ as a characterization of that work’s project. In that work, Anselm uses the second expression explicitly,²⁸ and maintains: “the rational basis [*ratio*] of the truth is so rich [*ampla*] and deep that it cannot be exhausted by mortal beings.”²⁹ Similar expressions appear in his other works.³⁰ Realities, particularly the most real ones faith gestures towards, possess an intelligibility

²¹ DC 3.11, p. 279

²² M10, p. 25. These nevertheless remain mediated to some degree through mental or verbal signs. In M 62, Anselm observes: “in the thought of a human being when he or she thinks of something which is outside of his or he mind, the expression [*verbum*] of the thing thought is not bon from the thing itself, since it is not present to the gaze of our thought, but [it is born] from some likeness or image of the thing that is in the memory of the one thinking, or perhaps at that time he thinks, it is being borne to the mind from the present thing by a bodily sense.” Even in one’s own mind’s reflection on itself, this is mediated by an image which does not perfectly coincide with its object, M 33. In M 36, we find that “created things exist much differently in themselves than they do in our knowledge of them. For in themselves, they are through their essence, but in our knowledge, it is not the essences of those things, but rather likenesses to them,” p. 55.

²³ M10, p. 24-5.

²⁴ While translators obviously do not intend to mislead, rendering *ratio* as “argument,” rather than “reasoning” lends itself to confusion with Anselm’s relatively infrequent uses of *argumentum* or verbal cognates. This generates a problem, for example, in determining how far the scope of the *unum argumentum* in *Proslogion* extends,

²⁵ A passage in which such a translation occurs (in Hopkin’s and Richardson’s) is DCD 20: “your argument is so bound together by true, necessary, and clear reasons that I do not in any respect see how what yo say can be undone,” *Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury* (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press. 2000), p. 249. Compare the Latin: “Sic tua disputatio veris et necessariis apertisque rationibus concatenatur, ut nulla ratione quod dicis dissolui posse videam,” p.264. This passage is illustrative of the problem and need for translation close to Anselm’s own terminological uses. *Ratio* is used twice, with arguably different, but clearly analogically related senses. “Argument” here translates not *argumentum* or *ratio*, but *disputatio*.

²⁶ P Pro, p. 93 (twice.)

²⁷ CDH Com, p. 39 (twice), 1.3, p. 50.

²⁸ CDH 2, p. 50. Anselm also uses the expression *altior*, translatable as “higher” or “deeper” for such reasons, eg. in DCV 21, p. 161.

²⁹ CDH Com, p. 40.

³⁰ M 64-65 and P 14-16 may be seen as thematizing this. In DI 1, one reads of “deeper” or “higher” things of faith.

which exceeds, but is penetrable and partly understandable by human reason, which generates its own reasonings in course of attempting to grasp and act within reality. God's reason of course, knows, or better put, encompasses these realities perfectly.³¹

II. Practical and Theoretical Reason: Enfolding

Philosophers frequently distinguish between theoretical (or speculative, or even "pure") reason, concerned with what is, what is true, and what is known, and practical reason, concerned with what is good or valuable, what should be, and what should be willed or done.³² Typically, fields of philosophy are apportioned along these lines, metaphysics, epistemology, and logic to theoretical reason, ethics, political philosophy, aesthetics to practical reason. The bulk of philosophy of religion, a main locus for study of the relationship between reason and faith (though at times operating with moral concepts and categories), seems to be a concern of theoretical reason. Philosophy *per se* is all too easily identified with theoretical reason, its activity, concerns, and products,³³ the effect being that where practical reason comes into play (particularly if anything of Christian faith accompanies it), we are now just doing moral philosophy, etc,

³¹ Though this is a topic far exceeding this paper, participation for Anselm means not only having a determinate quality corresponding to, caused by, modeled after a divine attribute. It also means that one is *in* God. For example, all truths are in some way in truth itself, DV 7, 10,12. In P19 and even more explicitly in M 14, we find all things are in, i.e, have their being in, God's being. By being within an inescapable providential ordering, which encompasses and turns even evil and injustice to divine ends, all justice and wisdom is likewise in God's wisdom and justice.

³² It is also possible to differentiate them not only by their objects or ranges of objects, but by their functions and activities. Thomas Aquinas does this, for instance in ST II-II, q 83, art. 1, in a discussion about prayer and reason: "Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes." There is a tension in the very notion of practical reason from the start, arising already in Aristotle's discussions of the practical syllogism, which purportedly has its conclusion not in knowledge, but action. Yet, practical reasoning, concerned with moral values, clearly generates and works by accounts and arguments which do not themselves terminate in action, but which could be applied in action.

³³ We see this even during the Christian philosophy debate which I will be using to illuminate faith's contributions to practical reason in Anselm's work. In *An Essay on Christian Philosophy*, Maritain, who held out for the possibility of an essence of philosophy independent of any philosophy's embodiments and formations in concrete historico-cultural states, and who held thus that philosophy *per se* could develop adequately independently from Christian faith, denied this for moral philosophy. This led to criticisms of his position from two sides.

Antonin Sertillanges accused him of inconsistency: "Is moral philosophy no longer philosophy? Moreover, how can one dissociate, so as to judge them different from a formal point of view, disciplines as connected as moral philosophy itself, psychology (even speculative, the metaphysics of the soul), and metaphysics in general, any more than in another sense from sociology and to politics?" "De la philosophie chrétienne," *Vie Intellectuelle*, v. 24. n. 1, p. 17. In Sertillanges' view, Maritain errs in dispensing philosophy *per se* from what applies to moral philosophy.

Fernand Van Steenberghen makes the opposite criticism: "The truth attained by philosophy is a *partial*, but in no way *provisional* or *hypothetical* truth, as it seems sometimes to be insinuated. . . Revelation does not come to suppress the conclusions of a true philosophy: it completes them, as grace perfects nature. Let us note lastly that, contrary to what Mr. Maritain thinks, all of this goes for moral philosophy as well as for theoretical philosophy. The conclusions of moral philosophy are not weakened, but confirmed and completed by revelation." "La IIe journée d'études de la Société Thomiste et la notion de 'philosophie chrétienne,'" *Revue Néo-scholastique de Philosophie*, v. 35, p. 546 fnt. 20

something to be done after or in addition to the real philosophy which does not need to learn anything on the way from moral philosophy. And yet (as numerous thinkers have pointed out from different vantage points), theoretical reason's activity and concerns (whether the reasoners realize it or not) are situated, oriented, and informed by those of practical reason.³⁴ One can go even farther than simply noting this, and adopt a much stronger position, a claim that the concepts and realities practical reason engages are already inextricably rooted at the very core of the intelligibility of those theoretical reason studies (including reason itself, in epistemology, philosophical anthropology, and in the metaphysics of knowledge).

Anselm does not in point of fact distinguish between theoretical and practical reason. For him there is just reason, whose tasks and objects, while they may be theoretical, are always situated in practical horizons. He does recognize great (indeed in God supreme) value to knowledge, reason, understanding, and wisdom,³⁵ all of which are goods, but pursuing these solely for their own sakes without reference to God, and one's relationship with God in ethical life oriented by rectitude, would to him be a mistake.³⁶ As G. R. Evans points out: "Anselm did not see the improving of the mind as an end in itself, but rather as a necessary concomitant of the process of getting to know God. A man who exercised his reason was using a God-given instrument for its proper purpose."³⁷ Human reason also takes in and studies the breadth of created being, both the world, and the human being itself with its cognitive powers, but for Anselm adequate knowledge of these will require relating these to God, and to rectitude. Practical reason challenges, situates, but also extends theoretical reason to its full range. Investigation of understanding of what is becomes truly enabled when one recognizes that value is as just primordial as being or truth, that their absolute locus lies in God, that what is or what is true is shot through and through in its very core and tissues by moral normativity and teleology,³⁸

³⁴ Just looking to the history of philosophy, one might think of Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche in the 19th century (as well as their numerous epigones in the 20th), and among numerous thinkers in the 20th, Maurice Blondel, Max Scheler, Dietrich Von Hildebrand, Alasdair MacIntyre.

³⁵ By its very nature, for Anselm (as for most in the Christian tradition going back to the early Fathers), wisdom is practical as well as theoretical or contemplative. And thus, if philosophy is understood to be the love, desire, or quest for wisdom, it will likewise be an activity which remains practically oriented. Even knowledge of God through contemplation must sometimes be situated within a more directly practical framework, and Anselm writes to candidate who wishes to avoid the office to which his community calls him: "I consider it more advantageous to you to preserve the peace of contemplation by love in your mind and the obedience of brotherly charity in your actions than to wish to choose contemplation alone by despising the prayers and the need of others," Ep. 345, p. 74.

³⁶ DHM 26- 36 contains very interesting discussion of curiosity, as one of three main currents of vice stemming from self-will (*propria voluntas*), productive of "restlessness, murmuring, detraction, and other such vices," 36, p. 50.

³⁷ "St. Anselm and Knowing God," p. 443.

³⁸ Englebert Rechtenwald interprets Anselm's thought as: "When something is known as as-it-should-be [*gesollt*], then at the same time it becomes known that this Should [*Sollen*] is not itself a temporal entity, which arises and vanishes with that which becomes as-it-should-be. . . . Whatever either actually is as being or can be thought can and must always be thought as standing under a Should which already is before it." "Das id quo maius

and that the very activity of reasoning is already imbued with moral quality and directedness.

Without attempting to enter here into a full exposition of what reason is and does for Anselm, I would like to focus very briefly on one of reason's key characteristics for Anselm: its discernment of values. "For [a] rational nature," he tells us in *Monologion*, "being rational is nothing other than being able to distinguish the just from the non-just, the true from the non-true, the good from the non-good, and the more good from the less good."³⁹ Rational natures' discernment of truth comprises a range of rectitudes that "rational reflection [*rationalis* . . . *contemplatio*] grasps,"⁴⁰ including justice.⁴¹ In Anselm's own practice we witness reason discerning other such values of things, relationships, even reasonings: the good as such (*honestum*), the useful, the beneficial (*commodum, quod expedit*), the necessary, the befitting, the useful, and the beautiful, just to name a few.⁴² Three points need be made about this function integral to reason. First, reason not only discerns, but itself possesses a teleology wired into it by its Creator,⁴³ which argues theoretical reason's dependence on and orientation by practical reason. Second, reason does not discern these categories or qualities unmediatedly, let alone infallibly, pointing towards a dependency and need for development on reason's part, this again a matter of practical reason. Third, while on the side of the subject, theoretical and practical reason might be distinguished by what they discern, on the side of the object, whether in God in whom the attributes attain identity, or in the beings and relationships of the created universe permeated by normativity, or within the human mind and its products, the qualities or dimensions discerned remain inextricably bound together.

In three of her articles, Marilyn McCord Adams makes points about reason in Anselm's work useful to raise at this point:

If for Anselm, intellectual inquiry is but one of several avenues along which human beings

cogitari non potest als rectitudo: Anselms Gottbeweis im Lichte von *De Veritate*", in *Twenty-Five Years of Anselm Studies*, ed. Frederick Van Fleterern and Joseph C. Schnaubelt (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen. 1996) p. 138.

³⁹ M 68, p. 78. Cf. also CDH 2.1, p. 97.

⁴⁰ DV 11, p. 191

⁴¹ DV 12, p. 192, DLA 4, p. 214.

⁴² Jorge J. E. Gracia and Jonathan J. Sanford develop a skeletal account of this function of discernment: "but how does reason operate and how does reasoning make us understand the good, the true, the just, and so on? There seem to be three aspects to this process. The first is the formation of concepts that correspond to realities; the second is th formulation of judgements; and the third is the development of arguments that support these judgements," "*Ratio Quaerens Beatitudinem*," Anselm on Rationality and Happiness," in *Rationality and Happiness: From the Ancients to the Early Medievals*, Ed. Jiyuan Yu and Jorge J. E. Gracia. (Rochester: University of Rochester Press. 2003), p. 206 Although in my estimate their account unduly deforms Anselm's thought by forcing it exclusively into somewhat too-restrictive and rather un-anselmian (rather Scholastic) categories (e.g. concepts, arguments), they are on the right track in attempting to correlate different intellectual value-engaging acts and functions with each other.

⁴³ Cf. M 68, 69, DLA 4, DI 1, CDH 1.1, 2.1 , DCV 10, DC 1.6, 3,2, and also *Dicta Anselmi* ch.17.

seek goods/ the GOOD/ God, it does not follow that for him practical reason expels theoretical, or that the latter is merely instrumentally related to the former. Anselm neither notes nor observes this Aristotelean distinction. Rather as one among other human powers, reason's exercise is partially constitutive of the search for the whole self . . .⁴⁴

In Anselm's thought, theoretical reason is, we might say, *enfolded into* practical reason, incorporated by it and enabled to its full exercise, purpose, and goods. Again contrasting Anselmian and Aristotelean approaches, she makes a second point:

Anselm's cognitive psychology contrasts with that of later medieval Aristoteleans, because it denies the existence of "unaided natural reason" and treats all creative problem solving as essentially collaborative : the creature seeks, the Creator discloses, the creature articulates what it has seen.⁴⁵

This collaboration is not solely between the creature and God. Adams writes of Scripture's and Tradition's "[a]uthority as tutor and guide,"⁴⁶ and discerns an "insistence on the on the human duty to interact with authority by seeking understanding," residing "at the center of Anselm's Christian pedagogy."⁴⁷ I agree, but expand this even farther in the fourth section.⁴⁸

Adams repeatedly elaborates an important third point, the interconnection between reason and other powers of the human soul. "Because our powers are few," she writes, "we cannot afford to leave any out."⁴⁹ Accordingly, where "advanced topics are concerned," in approaching mysteries of faith and problems arising out of them, or even in understanding created beings,⁵⁰ "intellectual expertise does not suffice for progress. Rather the focus of the whole self is

⁴⁴ "Fidens Quarens Intellectum," p. 414.

⁴⁵ "Praying the Proslogion," p. 37. Earlier she makes a claim with which I am in entire agreement: "Anselm takes for granted that human understanding is a work of collaboration, involving reciprocal initiative and response: the soul strives and seeks, thereby bringing the image of God that it is into clearer focus, tuning its instrument of knowledge as best it can; then God presses in and discloses; and the soul works to put into words what it has seen," p. 19.

⁴⁶ "Fides Quaerens Intellectum," p. 415.

⁴⁷ "Fides Quaerens Intellectum," p. 426.

⁴⁸ Adams might seem to be advocating what I do here in writing "Because our powers are feeble, necessarily reaching for what they cannot grasp, our exercise of them needs a teacher." "Elegant Necessity," p. 370. She continues: "Like is known by like' inspires hope for progress. For we are made in God's image, and pull ourselves into ever sharper focus the more we exercise our powers aright," p. 370. She does follow up briefly on the human-human interaction in "Fidens Quaerens Intellectum," seeing in Anselm's dialogues that "student/teacher relations model those of the human investigator to God," p. 415. She also examines the teaching dialogues in "Elegant Necessity," p. 381-384.

⁴⁹ "Elegant Necessity," p. 370

⁵⁰ We should remember Anselm attempting to beg off from the study in CDH because it would entail full study of several other very deep topics.

important, the coordination of intellectual effort with disciplined exercise of the soul's other powers, is necessary. . . the soul who trains will and emotions as well as reason will be capable of a clearer approach, a clearer view."⁵¹ She points out a last facet of the relationship between reason and the other powers: "In human beings, cognitive and affective powers interact. Just as the soul cannot will what it in no way thinks, so its ability to see is affected by its loves and choices."⁵²

III. Cooperation Between Faith and Practical Reason

In Anselm's view, faith and reason can be truly antagonistic only when the faith is not adequately understood or when reason remains underdeveloped. *Fides quaerens intellectum* through reason represents a project working, and measuring its success, by cooperation and concord between faith and reason. As Henri de Lubac puts it, Anselm's "extreme rationality does not signify an effort of intellect detached from the faith that is its origin and continues to carry it."⁵³ Now, given practical reason's priority in his thought, how does Christian faith contribute to, cultivate, and cooperate with practical reason? It does so through several modes, corresponding to the senses of faith distinguished earlier. I consider it helpful to set these within a framework articulated by Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain during the 1930s Christian philosophy debates, who understood it principally in terms of faith making contributions to human reason in the concrete, historical reality of the philosophizing subject. I have argued elsewhere that Anselm's thought fits and even expands their conceptions of Christian philosophy,⁵⁴ so I eschew detailed analysis here, and simply note a few modes of "revelation generative of reason" in Anselmian thought and practice.

How does Christian faith contribute something to reason? As belief in a revelation, or as the revelation itself, the content of belief, faith provides the rational and reasoning human being with a number of conceptions, claims, principles, valuations, and rules. In some cases, these lie beyond what reason could ever have attained on its own. In others, reason could have attained them, but on its own did not. In yet others, reason had some grasp or prefigurations of them, and Christianity confirms and clarifies, rather than straightforwardly provides. Each of these involves *fides quaerens intellectum*, exemplified in Anselm's narration of his reception and working out of

⁵¹ "Fides Quaerens Intellectum," p. 418.

⁵² "Praying the Proslogion," p. 17

⁵³ *Recherches dans la foi*, p. 93

⁵⁴ "St. Anselm's *Fides Quaerens Intellectum* as a Model for Christian Philosophy," *The Saint Anselm Journal*, v. 4, n. 1. Also cf. *Spicilegium Beccense*, v. 1, in which three articles dealt with the issue of Anselm and Christian philosophy: André Hayen, "Saint Anselme et Saint Thomas: la vraie nature de la théologie et sa portée apostolique"; Ramon Hernandez, "Les caractères fondamentaux de la philosophie de Saint Anselme"; and Philippe Delhaye, who writes in "Quelques aspects de la morale de S. Anselme": "one could say that [Anselm's] outline of the groundwork of ethics is an prime example of 'Christian philosophy'. It is philosophy because one discusses, reasons, and deduces. The treatises to which we have referred here are *disputationes*, essays of dialectical reflection, emerging from a need for systematization and rational clarity. But their psychological origin is the reading of Holy Scripture and the problems that it raises," p. 409.

the *unum argumentum*. Maritain called these “objective contributions,” and distinguished them from “subjective reinforcements” Christian faith provides the human subject, removing what are essentially moral obstacles to reason’s full exercise, generating or supporting proper moral habits, inclinations, and valuations, and strengthening the person in their right exercise of reason. Now, how do these objective contributions and subjective reinforcements by Christian faith to human reason play out in practical reason and in Anselm’s works?

One must be careful in answering this, not to set too great stress on originality (as perhaps Gilson and Maritain did), on the very first provision of a new idea, experience, or conception by Christian faith to human reason, or to human reason’s first grappling with or elaboration of what faith provided it. Though more reasons could be given for this, three suffice here. First, though his thought is bejeweled by great moments of original thought, Anselm himself did not seek for or seem to value human originality.⁵⁵ Second, what is key in the interaction between Christian faith and practical reason is not simply when reason first encounters faith’s objective contribution, but how deeply it delves into it. On that account Anselm may have gone further than many of his predecessors and even his successors.⁵⁶ Third, for reasons we will elaborate later, when faith and reason cooperate in a human subject, they do so continually. Faith does not simply provide, and then reason wholly take over. Instead, reason continues to be enriched by faith’s contributions.

In addition to functioning as a negative index for human reason,⁵⁷ Christian faith also

⁵⁵ As pointed out earlier, Anselm considers curiosity a vice, defining it as: “eagerness for lingering over examining [*perscrutandi*] those things that there is no usefulness in knowing,” DHM 26, p. 47. Even while departing in format from the established theological practices of citing authorities, he nevertheless stresses and measures the value of his works by continuity with Patristic authorities. As he tells us in P proem, and Eadmer amplifies in VA 1.19, one of his most original conceptions, the *unum argumentum* was for a period regarded by him as “uselessly impeding my mind, by occupying it, from other matters in which I could make some progress,” p. 93. For Anselm, the most important value an idea possesses is not whether it is original, or even interesting. It is whether it is true and useful.

⁵⁶ This touches on an interesting point, fuller exploration of which would require an article. I will accordingly simply note it here without providing the needed exegetical and argumentative support. In thinking about the contributions Christianity made to intellectual culture, particularly in and by the Middle Ages, one may assume that core ideas and experiences of Christianity were simply absorbed and taken for granted, so that intellectual life operated in an uncritically accepted and unquestioned horizon of Christian faith. What gets left out in is the fact, stressed by Maurice Blondel during the Christian philosophy debates, that Christianity can never be simply naturalized into a set of cultural acquisitions and assumptions. Put in terms of culture and society, even Christian ones remain in constant need for further, deeper, and ever-renewed Christianization.

⁵⁷ Anselm discusses this in DC 3.6, where he provides a way to tell if reasoning in line with Scripture. “If we say something by reasoning [*ratione*] that we cannot show to be clearly in the words of Scripture, or to be proved from them, we know in this way by means of Scripture whether it should be accepted or rejected: If it is worked out by clear reasoning and Scripture in no manner contradicts it – since Scripture, just as it opposes no truth, favors no falsity – by the very fact that it does not deny what is said by reasoning, that then is upheld by authority. But if Scripture undoubtably opposes a view of ours [*nostro sensui*], even though by our reason it appears to us to be unassailable, nevertheless we must believe that it is not supported by truth. And thus in this way, Sacred Scripture, since it either clearly affirms or in no way denies it, contains the authority for every truth that reason derives,” p. 271-2. At least for his own writings (and presumably he would extend this to other

contributes new moral conceptions to it. Consider as examples just four typical elements of moral theories and reasoning: understandings of virtues and vices; other key moral conceptions; fundamental orientations and valuations; and, the fabric of specific moral rules and authorities. Through Christian faith, new virtues are set out and exemplified, vices are identified, even at times in what human reason had previously (or in our post-Christian modernity, afterwards!) mistook as virtues. Anselm himself coins no new virtues, but stresses those whose value Christian faith imparts to the rational being, and sets practical reason the tasks of understanding, applying, and inculcating. Among those Anselm discusses specifically are humility, obedience, patience, peace or concord, faith, hope, charity, and justice, and through practical reasoning, he does make contributions to fuller understanding of these.⁵⁸ His treatment of justice as architectonic to moral life and practical reasoning illustrates in a particularly powerful way how Christian faith's cooperation with practical reason goes far beyond merely providing new content for reason to work over. As Dom Pouchet rightly stresses, "*rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata*. . . appears, alongside . . . *id quo maius cogitari non potest*, as one of Saint Anselm's most central thoughts [*intuitions majeures*]."⁵⁹

Anselm reexamines and reworks justice's very conception in the light faith casts on it. Other key moral notions are similarly more fully examined and worked out in his works, for instance freedom, intention, happiness, and weakness of will. Christian faith also adds or at the very least consolidates additional moral notions. Among those Anselm labors over are: original sin, sin as offense against God, redemption, divine providence, and God as love. Faith also informs practical reason about the proper orientation and needed reorientation of the human person to goods and evils, teaching for instance that God is to be loved above all other things, indicating where happiness truly resides, or revealing the horror and evil of sin. Practical reasoning thus informed can, and in Anselm's work does, discover and demonstrate that rectitude of will is to be preferred to other goods for its own sake, and that anything interfering or likely to

thinkers), Anselm also invokes the thought of the Church Fathers as a criterion in a similar way in M, proem, Ep. 77, DI 1, CDH, com, 1.1, 1.3.

⁵⁸ Justice is treated in one way or another in nearly all of the treatises, and a number of letters.. For a few examples of Anselm's teachings on these virtues cf. on Obedience, Ep. 233, 403; on Peace, Ep. 332, 450; Patience, Ep. 39, 73, 343; on Humility, DHM 101-8, DA 1-2, Ep. 285; on Charity, Ep. 112, 434

⁵⁹ "Existe-t-il," p. 6. Christian faith and thought not only provides the background to the conception of justice as *rectitudo vountatis propter se servata*, as Pouchet demonstrates in considerable detail. (*La rectitudo chez Saint Anselme*, chs. 1-4), it also provides *rectitudo vountatis propter se servata* with robust determinate content which prevents it from being evacuated and degenerating into an empty, purely formal notion. On this, cf. Dom Paschal Baumstein, O.S.B., "Anselm on the Dark Night and Truth" *Cistercian Studies Quarterly*, v. 35, n. 2; Baumstein "Saint Anselm and the Prospect of Perfection," *Faith and Reason*, v. 29; Phillipe Delhaye, "Quelque aspects de la morale de saint Anselme," *Spicilegium Beccense*, v. 1 (Paris: Vrin. 1959); Donald Duclow's "Structure and Meaning In Anselm's *De Veritate*," *American Benedictine Review*, v. 26, n. 4.; and my "Divine and Human Rectitude: Meeting Anselm's God through Moral Life," in *Essays on St. Anselm On the Occasion of the 900 Year Anniversary of His Death*, Fr. John Fortin, O.S.B. and Ralph McInerny, eds. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 2009).

interfere with this is to be rejected, even if otherwise good.⁶⁰ One striking example is supplied by charity's priority over knowledge, invoked and expounded in *Ep.* 85.⁶¹ Christian faith also supplies a rich tissue of specific moral injunctions, prohibitions, examples,⁶² even determinations about cases,⁶³ which practical reason then examines, assimilates, analogizes, applies, and perhaps systematizes.

Christian faith as belief, and as what is believed, aids reason in another manner, which ties in with each of the senses of reason distinguished earlier. Faith not only gives over to practical reason some content which ought to be more fully understood. It lays into reason's lap deep problems, their stakes raised and intensified by faith, which in its turn insists that at least some solution must be possible for reason in the sense of the faculty to produce as a rational account, which would in some way approximate to the deep rational structures of faith, leading us further into the supreme reason, God. As my fellow panel-member Montague Brown puts it, "Along with supplying the revealed teachings for reflection, faith tells us that these teachings, although they surpass human reason, are not absurd. . . . these teachings are not contradictions, but matter for ever deeper reflection and analysis."⁶⁴ Gillian Evans writes that Anselm's faith "forced him to

⁶⁰ DC 1.6. Correlatively, practical reason also finds out when what appear to be evil things are not really evil things. Punishment, chastisement, and satisfaction provide prime examples, and Anselm discusses such examples where what appears evil is really to one's good in e.g. DHM 77, 81, and *Ep.* 233. On this, Cf. G Mansini, "St. Anselm, 'Satisfactio,' and the 'Rule' of St. Benedict," *Revue Benedictine*, v. 97, n. 1-2, and my "Non Modo Verbis Sed Et Verberibus: Saint Anselm on Punishment, Coercion, and Violence," forthcoming in *Cistercian Studies Quarterly*.

⁶¹ p. 221.

⁶² There are the examples of the Saints and Mary of course, elaborated dramatically in Anselm's *Prayers*, and with respect to St. Elphege in *Vita* 1.30, but even more the example of Christ Himself, mentioned specifically, e.g. in CDH 2.11, 2.18.

⁶³ Anselm inherits, and expects his readership, to inherit and make use of the moral norms, principles, distinctions, and reasoning found in Scripture and in the tradition of Christian thought. Consider, for example, ch. 4 of the *Rule of Saint Benedict*, a short compendium of scriptural injunctions providing "the instruments of good works." Anselm takes Scripture's usefulness for moral understanding as a given. "In what way one is to approach participation in such a great grace, and in what way one is to live under it, everywhere Sacred Scripture teaches us," CDH 2.19, p.131. He tells the widow Basilia, "the whole of Holy Scripture, if you have it explained to you, teaches you how you ought to live," *Ep.* 420, p. 191. In the *Meditation on Human Redemption*, Anselm acknowledges to Christ: "you illuminated me, and showed me what I was, for when I was unable to see this, you taught others the truth on my behalf and you showed it to me before I asked it . . . You have set me upright and raised me to knowledge and love of yourself," p. 236.

Anselm also invokes the "law of Christianity," e.g. *Ep.* 424, p. 197, and the "law of God," e.g. *Ep.* 210, p. 157 (where the phrase is actually "the law and will of God." Eadmer reports Anselm as having asked King William Rufus for "revival of the Christian law which was being violated in many ways, and for the reform of morals which every day and in every class of people showed too many corruptions." VA 2.8, p. 69. Cf. also Eadmer's broader use of "law" in discussing Anselm's mode of moral instruction in VA 1.31. As Raymonde Foreville points out, however: "the divine law is not always explicitly formulated. In a number of cases. . . there is no clear, direct, and immediate reference, whether to divine precepts as they are contained in the Gospel or the Decalogue, or to the expression of the divine will as formulated in the apostolic decretals," "L'ultime 'ratio' de la morale politique de Saint Anselme: 'rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata,'" *Spicilegium Beccense*, v. 1, p. 435.

⁶⁴ Brown, "Faith and Reason in Anselm: Two Models," p. 20.

look for solutions outside the range of standard logical manipulation of accepted ideas.”⁶⁵ Eileen Sweeney provides a startling but appropriate formulation: “Faith as the desire to traverse the gap between what faith believes and what reason understands.”⁶⁶

A number of examples specifically engaging practical reason leap out from Anselm’s works: how anyone (e.g. the Devil) could use a good and God-given will to choose and become evil; why God would permit his Son to die for human beings and how that Atonement could restore justice; how ability to sin or not to sin is not freedom in its fullest sense; how our fullest and most natural happiness lies in God and voluntarily participating in the providential ordering; how human freedom is compatible with divine foreknowledge.⁶⁷ The harmony between divine justice and mercy provides a particularly good instance, even in the less elaborately worked out *Proslogion* discussions. “Though it is difficult to understand in what manner your mercy is not missing from your justice, it is nevertheless necessary to believe that it is in no way opposed to justice,”⁶⁸ and so Anselm is led several times to keep rationally seeking a solution to what appears an irreconcilable contradiction, gradually discerning what actions are juster and juster yet,⁶⁹ culminating in a rational account, which records the rational being’s striving to penetrate into the rationality of God’s justice (*ratio. . . justitiae*), the hidden reason for God’s gentleness with sinners,⁷⁰ and also determines what in God’s reason, specifically set in the providential ordering, cannot be understood by human reason.⁷¹ Within this Anselmian use of reason in faith, two other key things happen. He calls upon God several times to aid the progress of this reasoning,⁷² and he reasons to practical conclusions, culminating both in his action of invocation of mercy and in determination of what the right affective response is.

⁶⁵ Evans, “The ‘Secure Technician’,” p. 11

⁶⁶ “Anselm’s *Proslogion*: the Desire for the Word,” p. 23.

⁶⁷ Of this problem, whose full treatment is deferred to *De Concordia*, Anselm has his student say: “Now I am reminded of that very well known question about divine foreknowledge and free choice. For although it is asserted with so much authority and held with so much utility that in no way should it on account of any human reasoning be doubted that divine foreknowledge and free choice are compatible with each other, still so far as they appear to reason’s consideration, they appear to be in strong disagreement [*insociabiliter. . . dissentire*],” DCD 21, p. 266.

⁶⁸ P 9, p. 108

⁶⁹ For fuller discussion of this, cf. my “Mercy and Justice in Saint Anselm’s *Proslogion*.” The progression Anselm articulates in fact sets new flesh on the bones of the formula *quo maius cogitari non potest*. “You are so good that you cannot be understood to be any better [*nequeas intelligi melior*], and work so powerfully that you cannot be thought to be more powerful [*non possis cogitari potentius*]. For what is more just than this?” P 9, p. 108. “It is just, that You are so just that You cannot be thought to be more just [*iustior nequeas cogitari*],” P 11, p. 109.

⁷⁰ P 9, p. 107

⁷¹ P 11, p. 109. He also acknowledges several times that God’s goodness itself cannot be fully comprehended

⁷² P 9, p. 108 (twice)

This mode of cooperation between faith and practical reason also generates and is reflected in a fundamental attitude of the rational being, bringing us to yet another mode of cooperation. In its more dynamic, active sense rooted in the person and going beyond propositions and belief in them, Christian faith also engenders in the rational human being what Maritain termed “subjective reinforcements.” As noted earlier, living faith for Anselm involves and incorporates striving, action, love, relationship, each of which is not only studied and structured by practical reason, but also enables and furthers the full development and use of that practical reason. It is thus transformative, purifying and strengthening the human person in whom reason is a power. Within the matrix of faith, and attentive to the intricate connections between reason and the will, Anselm generates what I have elsewhere termed an “ethics of the use of the mind.”⁷³ One general tenet of this is that adequate understanding of justice will be conditioned in a variety of ways by the justice or injustice of the rational person’s will.⁷⁴ Justice in the will assists the reasoning person from being led astray by the carnal appetites (which for Anselm cover a very wide ground), from ignoring reason altogether, subordinating reason to their satisfaction, or cutting reason’s activity short.⁷⁵ It also restores to the human being a proper orientation to and valuation of goods, rectifying practical reason, permitting it to carry out its function of discernment better. If it does not restore this in full, it at least enables more proper understanding, willing, and affective disposition towards this orientation and valuation.⁷⁶

A dynamic and ongoing interaction between objective contributions and subjective reinforcements structures Christian faith’s cooperation with practical reason, so that faith remains continually involved and drawn upon by reason. On one pole, *fides* as belief calls to *intellectus*,

⁷³ I suggest this in “Freedom, Inclinations of the Will, and Virtue in Anselm,” p. 100. Dom Baumstein has gone in this direction in his articles and his yet-unpublished manuscript *Vita Veritatis: Saint Anselm on Monastic Character* (archived at the Institute for St. Anselm Studies and at Belmont Abbey). Following his leads, I attempt to draw out an Anselmian ethics of the use of the mind in a more systematic manner in a volume I am currently writing on St. Anselm’s moral theory.

⁷⁴ Already in saying: “It is clear that the rational creature should expend all of its ability [*posse*] and will [*velle*] on remembering and understanding and loving the highest good,” M 68, p. 79, the will is already determinately involved in intellectual activity. In DHM 3, only when the will is conjoined to God, is it “opened to the disposition of the virtues and to willing what should be preferred [*volendum optanda*], *memory* to the remembering of things that should be remembered, *thought* to the thinking of things that should be thought upon, *understanding* to distinguishing what is to be willed or remembered or thought.” Disorder of the will has intellectual consequences, which then feed back into the will, since the soul “can neither keep nor possess [*justice*] unless it is understood [*non intellecta*]” DCV 8, p. 149. One can “be sunken by one sin after another even into the bottomless abyss of sin. . . .so that the good is even turned for him to something hateful”, DC 3.8. p. 275. “Without faith and obedience to God’s commandments. . . sometimes by good conscience being neglected, the understanding [*previously*] given,” DI 1, p. 8. “[T]he soul that is weighted down by the body which is corrupted cannot even understand [*justice*]”, and this introduces a major problem, since that justice “cannot be kept nor had when not understood,” DCV 8, p. 149.

⁷⁵ In DC 3.12, Anselm frames this as uprightness favoring the spirit against the flesh.

⁷⁶ Anselm exhibits precisely this in several of his prayers, e.g. “I have prayed, Lord, as I can, but I wish I could do more. . . . ear me always with your favor, not as my heart wills or as my mouth asks, but as you know and will that I ought to wish and ask,” *Prayer for Enemies*, p. 219.

which then goes to work, and both gives back to it what it gave now more fully understood and draws from it what it yet other things used in the very process of reasoning and understanding. On another pole, *fides* as lived and living gives *intellectus* its orientation and support, and in turn counts on proper practical reasoning both as activity and as products. These set the human person in the condition where the dynamic of the first pole can fruitfully occur, and in turn, what is thus understood is then put to work in the second pole, for after all, the conclusion of practical reasoning is ultimately in action. In the course of this dynamic, faith also progressively reveals, and reason (both theoretical and practical reason) comes to discover and understand the very purposes, values, and natures of the human faculties, including reason and will, but also memory and imagination, and even the appetites. This is what we find carried out in Anselm's writings.

This dynamic is complex, precisely because the human person is, and the realities it wishes to engage in its knowledge and action are, at least on our end. Moral notions corresponding to genuine realities are complex enough and require unfolding, weighing, following out, elaboration, often in light of, and within a matrix of other notions contributed by faith. In this process they inevitably lead us, and our reasons, further into a transcendent, divine, and eminently personal reality for which we could never finish questing and questioning.⁷⁷ Ultimately, Christian faith offers to human reason a deeper understanding of its nature, norms, and telos, and of the fact that it has an ultimate reference point not in itself or in the cosmos but in a God who is supreme reason.

IV. Three Other Aspects of the Interaction Between Faith and Practical Reason

For Anselm, while the instrument of reason is not in itself affective, our rationality is not something entirely extricable from our affectivity. Although he does not say this, since he never specifically studies reason as *usus* or as *affectio*, it is not contrary to the spirit of his thought to suggest that these concrete actualizations of the instrument could, perhaps even should, involve affectivity. In fact proper affective response not only may enable or sustain reason in its activity, it even provides a measure for the adequacy and depth of understanding attained by reason. Numerous passages exhibit affective responses occurring in *fides quaerens intellectum*'s course, not least of which is the joy (*gaudium*) with which Anselm grasped the *unum argumentum* and hoped to offer to his readers,⁷⁸ leading De Lubac to write of anselmian "reason's joy in the

⁷⁷ Anselm's *Proslogion* provides a prime example here, in its movement into the *lux inaccessibilis*, where ultimately the personal Triune God is found in c. 23 As Delhaye observes: "Saint Anselm addresses a call to continual going-further-beyond [*dépassement*]," "Quelque aspects de la morale de S. Anselme," p. 412. He has in mind texts such as Ep. 131 or 231. "Reflexive philosophers" (e.g. Paliard, Forest, Rassam, Schur) interpretations of Anselm, and the interpretation of Coloman Viola have particularly stressed this inextricably ethical aspect of Anselm's thought. Cf. in particular Viola, "St. Anselm, the theologian of the greatness of God," *Hermathena*, v. 166. It must also be noted that the personal relationship with God also determinately involves the Christian subject with salvation history, the church, and the community of the saints, the cloud of witnesses, the mystical body of Christ.

⁷⁸ P, proem, p, 93. Eadmer writes that "unmeasurable joy and jubilation filled his entire inmost being," p.

understanding of faith.”⁷⁹

Properly functioning reason also determines and culminates in affectivity. *Cur Deus Homo* contains one particularly rich passage:

in this mortal life, there should be such love, and – prayer pertains to this – desire of arriving at what you were created for [*ad quod factus es*], and sadness because you are not yet there, and fear lest you not reach it, so that you should not feel any joy except about those things that either give you assistance or the hope of arriving [at what you were created for].”⁸⁰

In *Monologion* reason arrives at seeing that “the rational creature ought to devote all of its capacities and its will [*posse et uelle*] to remembering and understanding and loving the Highest Good.”⁸¹ Such loving requires that the “human being should endeavor towards that good by loving and desiring with its whole heart, whole soul, and whole mind,”⁸² and that it cultivate hope and faith.⁸³ Likewise, in *De Concordia*, “reason, by which we understand rectitude, teaches that this rectitude is to be kept out of love for that same rectitude.”⁸⁴ Reason’s ongoing dynamic is awakened and sustained by affectivity, for instance through the intense yearning expressed in almost bodily terms in *Proslogion*, or the “charity and religious zeal” motivating Anselm’s audience’s request to approach questions of the faith through reason, mirrored throughout the work in his pupil’s desire.

Lastly, Anselm writes in some places as if affectivity is not merely consequent upon, but integral to reason’s work. In the *Meditation on Human Redemption*, one is to think, understand, and love, and to “rejoice,” “be glad,” and “delight” in each of these respectively.⁸⁵ The overarching goal is to introduce proper affectivity into reason’s work: “make me to taste by loving what I taste by knowing. Let me sense by affection what I sense by understanding.”⁸⁶ In Ep. 5, writing about mutual love, Anselm counsels: “let us, enjoying their affection with

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⁷⁹ De Lubac, p. 87.

⁸⁰ CDH 1.20, p. 87. Cf. Bernd Goebel and Vittorio Hösle, “Reasons, Emotions, and God’s Presence in Anselm of Canterbury’s Dialogue *Cur Deus Homo*”, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, v. 87 (2005)

⁸¹ M 68, p. 79

⁸² M 74, p. 83

⁸³ M 75, p. 83, 76, p. 83.

⁸⁴ DC 1.6, p. 257

⁸⁵ p. 419 – get Schmitt

⁸⁶ p.. 426 – get Schmitt

reasonable pleasure, prepare ourselves to enjoy them with joyful reason.”⁸⁷ One might disregard this as merely use of the rhetorical trope of chiasm, but in the *Prayer to Saint Paul*, several characteristic and very suggestive Anselmian passages appear. As in other places, one consequence of a human being’s sins and vices are their interference with reason’s proper discernment of moral values, direction of the will away from salutary lines of thinking and reasoning and towards harmful ones, and even interference with reasoning. Here, Anselm laments the disconnect between what reason and faith tell him is his case and what his sins lead him to think: “this crowning unhappiness – that while it is all true, yet it does not seem so to me.” What is particularly interesting is that he realizes affectivity is the index of true grasp of his situation. “In fact, if I did see the reality, I should not feel it or be moved by it. Reason teaches this, but my heart does not grieve.”⁸⁸ Later in the prayer, he writes again that he did not grieve because : “I knew through my rational nature, but I did not understand.”⁸⁹ Christian faith and practical reason meet and interact fruitfully through affectivity.⁹⁰

Another important aspect of the relationship between faith and reason is divine grace’s involvements. As Anselm begs off from a full treatment of grace in *De Concordia*,⁹¹ so do I here. After noting that reason is an integral constituent of the “free choice,” Anselm demonstrates to “coexist with grace and to work with it in many ways,”⁹² I will merely point out three ways in which grace more fully enables practical reason and in turn is partially intelligible to practical reason. First, as Adams noted, God is not merely an object but a collaborator in *fides quaerens intellectum*. Anselm’s mentions of invocations of God in the course of inquiry are too frequent to

⁸⁷ p. 84

⁸⁸ p. 143. Even further, affectivity is the hinge in this rational being between reason and the proper response in volition and action. If only he could feel and cry, Anselm continues, “perhaps I might hope; hoping, I would pray; praying, I might obtain. When truly, because of my wretchedness, feeling and grief are not in me, how can I hope? Without hope, how can I pray? And, without prayer, what can I obtain?” p. 143 Practical reason can tell him that he ought to do and have these, but affectivity is needed, and practical reasoning within the matrix of faith reveals to him this further need.

⁸⁹ p. 149

⁹⁰ On the other hand, affectivity can also in myriad ways interfere with and stultify reason, particularly practical reason, in its orientation towards and understanding of the good. A prime example of this is found in Anselm’s criticism of the abbot who attempted to correct his young charges through more and more and more beatings: “being thus injudiciously oppressed, they harbor and welcome and nurse within themselves evil and crooked thoughts like briars, and cherish these thoughts so passionately that they doggedly reject everything which could minister to their correction. Hence, feeling no love or pity, good-will or tenderness in your attitude towards them, they have in future no faith in your goodness but believe all of your actions proceed from hatred and envy against them. The deplorable result is. . . their hatred increases, along with their apprehension of evil, and [they wind up] ever inclined and bent towards the vices,” Vita 1.22, p. 37-8. Notice that Anselm’s intervention and judgement here is an instance of practical reason cooperating with faith, which rectifies the reason of the other abbot, whose response is at once intellectual, affective, and volitional.

⁹¹ At least in one respect. “Since it does this in multifarious ways, I am not up to enumerating the ways in which grace aids free will,” DC 3.4, p. 267

⁹² DC 3.1

even cite representative examples.⁹³ None is more apt here than Anselm's resolve in *De Concordia*: "let us study grace and free choice, that very grace assisting us."⁹⁴ Second, although by free choice human beings can prefer and preserve justice, once it is lost, only divine grace restores it. Without justice in the will (sometimes even with it!) human beings face innumerable obstacles to full and proper use of practical reason, particularly in their discernment, understanding, and reasoning about justice and injustice. Christian faith in each of the senses discussed earlier does not produce justice, but contributes to well-functioning practical reason's grasp on it. Third, Anselm is clear that grace is bestowed making full use of the providential ordering, and particularly of human intermediaries. The restoration of justice, and the aid to practical reasoning typically comes through those of the Christian faith, both believing and practicing it. These sow and cultivate seeds of right thoughts and volitions in human hearts, which are to then produce further fruit, bearing further seeds.⁹⁵ And, "since what develops from [*descendit ex*] grace is a grace," preaching, hearing, understanding what is heard, and rectitude of willing are all instances of graces.⁹⁶ Human collaboration with God, in which Christian faith informs practical reason, takes place precisely through other human collaborators.

This brings us then to a last aspect, for as it turns out, faith is not simply an attitude of belief, nor the content believed in, but rather as pointed out earlier, relationship, striving, love transformative of the rational human being. Further though, it takes form not simply through a putatively unmediated relationship with God,⁹⁷ but through determinate human relationships, institutions,⁹⁸ communities in which Christian faith is embodied, inculcated, modeled, even debated and developed. Because of our human weaknesses, both those stemming from sin and those inherent in our finite nature, the practical reason of one needs the practical reason of another, so that "if the one falls, the other will lift up his companion" (Eccl 4:10). Nowhere is this more apparent than in Anselm's *Letters*, in many of which he gives advice about practical reasoning, two typical lines of which are particularly interesting. The first depicts and enacts a

⁹³ I believe these passages may be categorized into four main types. First, there are cases where Anselm prays directly to God for assistance in the inquiry. Second, there are cases where Anselm or his interlocutor states or hopes God (at times as a divine attribute) will help in the inquiry. Third, there are cases where it is asserted that God has revealed something in the course of inquiry. Last, there are the relatively rare passages which show Anselm reliant on the Augustinian divine illumination concept.

⁹⁴ DC 3.1, p. 263

⁹⁵ DC 3.6, p. 272-3 Originally the seeds, like all created beings, come from God, so that "without human teaching He miraculously caused the hearts of the prophets and the apostles, and no less the Gospels, to be fertile with salvation-bringing seeds," p. 271.

⁹⁶ DC 3.6, p. 271

⁹⁷ For Anselm, even on a purely intellectual plane (if there is such a thing), there is no relationship with God unmediated by images, signs, words. And, until we exist in eternity, since a human being is not what he is all the time, even a relationship with God seemingly more immediate through affectivity, will, or action, remains mediated.

⁹⁸ Particularly in Anselm's view, Benedictine monasticism.

clash of reasons, between diabolically suggested “toxic reason”⁹⁹ arguing for something subversive or deleterious to faith and justice, and a faith-informed and supported practical reason by which among others, “the wise monk can refute and destroy [the] cunning cajolery.”¹⁰⁰

The second, by which I close here, speaks for itself:

We should take great care not to follow our own will excessively against all other advice, even if it appears to us to be right. For what is right to a single person may not be right. . . . [A] man should in no way commit himself to ordering his way of life according to his own unqualified judgement but should diligently weigh all things, lest he oppose the judgement of many, particularly the wise, or oppose obedience or mercy, or finally charity.¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ Ep. 37, p. 134, (replicated in Vita); .cf. also Ep. 101, 185, 230. It need not be the Devil, however; it can also be the world, or the flesh (the carnal appetites) as it is in Ep. 121.

¹⁰⁰ Ep. 37, p. 136

¹⁰¹ Ep. 62, p. 175-6